

# TGI( $\phi$ ) Day!

Q	A
Where?	Nathan Hale 'Pub'
When?	4pm–6pm; Friday 16 Feb 07
Why?	

*Potential theses to be discussed . . .*

- that there are no ordinary, macro-sized objects.<sup>1</sup>
- that classical logic is the logic of 'true'.<sup>2</sup>
- that ethical properties are unnatural (and, hence, non-physical).<sup>3</sup>
- that you are an arbitrary object.<sup>4</sup>
- that the mind is non-physical.<sup>5</sup>
- that knowledge does not entail truth.<sup>6</sup>
- that proper names are not rigid.<sup>7</sup>
- that naturalism is a misguided stance.<sup>8</sup>
- that constitution is identity.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Argument: if there were ordinary, macro-sized objects, then there'd be *ordinary* objects. The likelihood of any contingent object coming into existence is miniscule, and so anything that actually exists is *extraordinary*. So, there are no ordinary objects, and so no ordinary, macro-sized objects.

<sup>2</sup>Argument: what else could it be?!

<sup>3</sup>Argument: smart, sincere philosophers have long been deeply puzzled by ethical properties. Nobody puzzles over things that they find perfectly natural. So, ethical properties are unnatural.

<sup>4</sup>Argument: let  $x$  be an arbitrary object. Hence,  $x$  is arbitrary. Given that  $x$  was arbitrary, we conclude that everything is arbitrary, by universal generalization. Hence, by universal instantiation, you are arbitrary.

<sup>5</sup>Argument: 'mind', properly translated, means *spirit*. Necessarily, spirits are non-physical.

<sup>6</sup>Argument: you know yourself, but your self isn't truth. Hence, you can know something without it being true. Whence, knowledge doesn't entail truth.

<sup>7</sup>Argument: a name is rigid just if it denotes the same thing at all worlds where that thing exists. Consider a world  $w$  in which there's no language but in which Max exists. Since there's no language at  $w$ , Max has no name at  $w$ , and hence 'Max' doesn't name Max at  $w$ . Hence, 'Max', which is a proper name, is not rigid. Hence, proper names, in general, are not rigid.

<sup>8</sup>Argument: if, per naturalism, everything is *natural*, then there'd be nothing unnatural in the world. But *that there's nothing unnatural in the world* is terribly surprising, and indeed unnatural. Hence, naturalism is self-defeating. QED (Cf. argument on ethical properties.)

<sup>9</sup>Argument: without loss of generality, consider a toy made of exactly one indivisible,  $w$ -inhabiting block (where  $x$  is  $w$ -inhabiting iff  $x$  exists *at and only at*  $w$ ). The toy is clearly identical with the block of which it is made. QED